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Abstract—Security challenges are still among the biggest obstacles when considering the adoption of cloud services. This triggered
a lot of research activities, resulting in a quantity of proposals targeting the various cloud security threats. Alongside with these
security issues, the cloud paradigm comes with a new set of unique features, which open the path toward novel security approaches,
techniques, and architectures. This paper provides a survey on the achievable security merits by making use of multiple distinct
clouds simultaneously. Various distinct architectures are introduced and discussed according to their security and privacy capabilities
and prospects.
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1 INTRODUCTION
CLOUD computing offers dynamically scalable resourcesprovisioned as a service over the Internet. The third-
party, on-demand, self-service, pay-per-use, and seamlessly
scalable computing resources and services offered by the
cloud paradigm promise to reduce capital as well as
operational expenditures for hardware and software.
Clouds can be categorized taking the physical location
from the viewpoint of the user into account [1]. A public
cloud is offered by third-party service providers and
involves resources outside the user’s premises. In case the
cloud system is installed on the user’s premise—usually in
the own data center—this setup is called private cloud. A
hybrid approach is denoted as hybrid cloud. This paper will
concentrate on public clouds, because these services
demand for the highest security requirements but also—as
this paper will start arguing—includes high potential for
security prospects.
In public clouds, all of the three common cloud service
layers (IaaS, Paas, SaaS) share the commonality that the
end-users’ digital assets are taken from an intraorganiza-
tional to an interorganizational context. This creates a
number of issues, among which security aspects are
regarded as the most critical factors when considering
cloud computing adoption [2]. Legislation and compliance
frameworks raise further challenges on the outsourcing of
data, applications, and processes. The high privacy stan-
dards in the European Union, e.g., and their legal variations
between the continent’s countries give rise to specific
technical and organizational challenges [3].
One idea on reducing the risk for data and applications
in a public cloud is the simultaneous usage of multiple
clouds. Several approaches employing this paradigm have
been proposed recently. They differ in partitioning and
distribution patterns, technologies, cryptographic methods,
and targeted scenarios as well as security levels. This paper
is an extension of [4] and contains a survey on these
different security by multicloud adoption approaches. It
provides four distinct models in form of abstracted multi-
cloud architectures. These developed multicloud architec-
tures allow to categorize the available schemes and to
analyze them according to their security benefits. An
assessment of the different methods with regards to legal
aspects and compliance implications is given in particular.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
motivates the need for effective cloud security counter-
measures by briefly reviewing the current state of play. The
observations further lead to the fact that most of the
research and development work is currently devoted to
dedicated security schemes, which do not consider the
specific properties of the cloud itself. Only recently some
proposals on making use of multiple distinct clouds at
the same time to realize security goals started to appear. To
provide a formal ground to categorize and analyze these
proposals, we propose a set of four distinct multicloud
architectures. These multicloud architectures are intro-
duced in Section 3 and each of them is further discussed
in Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7, including case studies. Section 8
provides a consideration of legal and compliance aspects.
Finally, in Section 9, an assessment and comparison of the
presented approaches is given.
2 CLOUD SECURITY ISSUES
Cloud computing creates a large number of security issues
and challenges. A list of security threats to cloud computing
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is presented in [5]. These issues range from the required
trust in the cloud provider and attacks on cloud interfaces
to misusing the cloud services for attacks on other systems.
The main problem that the cloud computing paradigm
implicitly contains is that of secure outsourcing of sensitive
as well as business-critical data and processes. When
considering using a cloud service, the user must be aware
of the fact that all data given to the cloud provider leave the
own control and protection sphere. Even more, if deploying
data-processing applications to the cloud (via IaaS or PaaS),
a cloud provider gains full control on these processes.
Hence, a strong trust relationship between the cloud
provider and the cloud user is considered a general
prerequisite in cloud computing.
Depending on the political context this trust may touch
legal obligations. For instance, Italian legislation requires
that government data of Italian citizens, if collected by
official agencies, have to remain within Italy. Thus, using
a cloud provider from outside of Italy for realizing an
e-government service provided to Italian citizens would
immediately violate this obligation. Hence, the cloud users
must trust the cloud provider hosting their data within
the borders of the country and never copying them to an
off-country location (not even for backup or in case of
local failure) nor providing access to the data to entities
from abroad.
An attacker that has access to the cloud storage
component is able to take snapshots or alter data in the
storage. This might be done once, multiple times, or
continuously. An attacker that also has access to the
processing logic of the cloud can also modify the functions
and their input and output data. Even though in the
majority of cases it may be legitimate to assume a cloud
provider to be honest and handling the customers’ affairs in
a respectful and responsible manner, there still remains a
risk of malicious employees of the cloud provider, success-
ful attacks and compromisation by third parties, or of
actions ordered by a subpoena.
In [6], an overview of security flaws and attacks on cloud
infrastructures is given. Some examples and more recent
advances are briefly discussed in the following. Ristenpart
et al. [7], [8] presented some attack techniques for the
virtualization of the Amazon EC2 IaaS service. In their
approach, the attacker allocates new virtual machines until
one runs on the same physical machine as the victim’s
machine. Then, the attacker can perform cross-VM side-
channel attacks to learn or modify the victim’s data. The
authors present strategies to reach the desired victim
machine with a high probability, and show how to exploit
this position for extracting confidential data, e.g., a
cryptographic key, from the victim’s VM. Finally, they
propose the usage of blinding techniques to fend cross-VM
side-channel attacks.
In [9], a flaw in the management interface of Amazon’s
EC2 was found. The SOAP-based interface uses XML
Signature as defined in WS-Security for integrity protection
and authenticity verification. Gruschka and Iacono [9]
discovered that the EC2 implementation for signature
verification is vulnerable to the Signature Wrapping Attack
[10]. In this attack, the attacker—who eavesdropped a
legitimate request message—can add a second arbitrary
operation to the message while keeping the original
signature. Due to the flaw in the EC2 framework, the
modification of the message is not detected and the injected
operation is executed on behalf of the legitimate user and
billed to the victim’s account.
A major incident in a SaaS cloud happened in 2009 with
Google Docs [11]. Google Docs allows users to edit
documents (e.g., text, spreadsheet, presentation) online
and share these documents with other users. However, this
system had the following flaw: Once a document was
shared with anyone, it was accessible for everyone the
document owner has ever shared documents with before.
For this technical glitch, not even any criminal intent was
required to get unauthorized access to confidential data.
Recent attacks have demonstrated that cloud systems of
major cloud providers may contain severe security flaws in
different types of clouds (see [12], [13]).
As can be seen from this review of the related work on
cloud system attacks, the cloud computing paradigm
contains an implicit threat of working in a compromised
cloud system. If an attacker is able to infiltrate the cloud
system itself, all data and all processes of all users operating
on that cloud system may become subject to malicious
actions in an avalanche manner. Hence, the cloud computing
paradigm requires an in-depth reconsideration on what
security requirements might be affected by such an exploita-
tion incident. For the common case of a single cloud provider
hosting and processing all of its user’s data, an intrusion
would immediately affect all security requirements: Acces-
sibility, integrity, and confidentiality of data and processes
may become violated, and further malicious actions may be
performed on behalf of the cloud user’s identity.
These cloud security issues and challenges triggered a lot
of research activities, resulting in a quantity of proposals
targeting the various cloud security threats. Alongside with
these security issues, the cloud paradigm comes with a new
set of unique features that open the path toward novel
security approaches, techniques, and architectures. One
promising concept makes use of multiple distinct clouds
simultaneously.
3 SECURITY PROSPECTS BY MULTICLOUD
ARCHITECTURES
The basic underlying idea is to use multiple distinct clouds
at the same time to mitigate the risks of malicious data
manipulation, disclosure, and process tampering. By
integrating distinct clouds, the trust assumption can be
lowered to an assumption of noncollaborating cloud service
providers. Further, this setting makes it much harder for an
external attacker to retrieve or tamper hosted data or
applications of a specific cloud user.
The idea of making use of multiple clouds has been
proposed by Bernstein and Celesti [14], [15]. However, this
previous work did not focus on security. Since then, other
approaches considering the security effects have been
proposed. These approaches are operating on different
cloud service levels, are partly combined with crypto-
graphic methods, and targeting different usage scenarios.
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In this paper, we introduce a model of different
architectural patterns for distributing resources to multiple
cloud providers. This model is used to discuss the security
benefits and also to classify existing approaches.
In our model, we distinguish the following four
architectural patterns:
. Replication of applications allows to receive multiple
results from one operation performed in distinct
clouds and to compare them within the own premise
(see Section 4). This enables the user to get an
evidence on the integrity of the result.
. Partition of application System into tiers allows to
separate the logic from the data (see Section 5). This
gives additional protection against data leakage due
to flaws in the application logic.
. Partition of application logic into fragments allows
distributing the application logic to distinct clouds
(see Section 6). This has two benefits. First, no cloud
provider learns the complete application logic.
Second, no cloud provider learns the overall
calculated result of the application. Thus, this leads
to data and application confidentiality.
. Partition of application data into fragments allows
distributing fine-grained fragments of the data to
distinct clouds (see Section 7). None of the involved
cloud providers gains access to all the data, which
safeguards the data’s confidentiality.
Each of the introduced architectural patterns provides
individual security merits, which map to different applica-
tion scenarios and their security needs. Obviously, the
patterns can be combined resulting in combined security
merits, but also in higher deployment and runtime effort.
The following sections present the four patterns in more
detail and investigate their merits and flaws with respect to
the stated security requirements under the assumption of
one or more compromised cloud systems.
4 REPLICATION OF APPLICATION
How does a cloud customer know whether his data were
processed correctly within the cloud? There is no technical
way to guarantee that an operation performed in a cloud
system was not tampered with or that the cloud system was
not compromised by an attacker. The only kind of
guarantee is based on the level of trust between the cloud
customer and the cloud provider and on the contractual
regulations made between them such as SLAs, applicable
laws, and regulations of the involved jurisdictional
domains. But even if the relation and agreements are
perfectly respected by all participants, there still remains a
residual risk of getting compromised by third parties.
To solve this intrinsic problem, multiple distinct clouds
executing multiple copies of the same application can be
deployed (see Fig. 1). Instead of executing a particular
application on one specific cloud, the same operation is
executed by distinct clouds. By comparing the obtained
results, the cloud user gets evidence on the integrity of the
result. In such a setting, the required trust toward the cloud
service provider can be lowered dramatically. Instead of
trusting one cloud service provider totally, the cloud user
only needs to rely on the assumption, that the cloud
providers do not collaborate maliciously against herself.
Assume that n > 1 clouds are available (like, e.g.,
Clouds A and B in Fig. 1). All of the n adopted clouds
perform the same task. Assume further that f denotes the
number of malicious clouds and that n f > f the majority
of the clouds are honest. The correct result can then be
obtained by the cloud user by comparing the results and
taking the majority as the correct one. There are other
methods of deriving the correct result, for instance using
the TurpinCoan algorithm [16] for solving the General
Byzantine Agreement problem.
Instead of having the cloud user performing the
verification task, another viable approach consists in having
one cloud monitoring the execution of the other clouds. For
instance, Cloud A may announce intermediate results of its
computations to an associated monitoring process running
at Cloud B. This way, Cloud B can verify that Cloud A
makes progress and sticks to the computation intended by
the cloud user. As an extension of this approach, Cloud B
may run a model checker service that verifies the execution
path taken by Cloud A on-the-fly, allowing for immediate
detection of irregularities.
This architecture enables to verify the integrity of results
obtained from tasks deployed to the cloud. On the other
hand, it needs to be noted that it does not provide any
protection in respect to the confidentiality of data or
processes. On the contrary, this approach might have a
negative impact on the confidentiality because—due to the
deployment of multiple clouds—the risk rises that one of
them is malicious or compromised. To implement protec-
tion against an unauthorized access to data and logic this
architecture needs to be combined with the architecture
described in Section 5.
The idea of resource replication can be found in many
other disciplines. In the design of dependable systems, for
example, it is used to increase the robustness of the system
especially against system failures [17]. In economic busi-
ness processes—and especially in the management of
supply chains—single-source suppliers are avoided to
lower the dependency on suppliers and increase the
flexibility of the business process [18]. In all these cases,
the additional overhead introduced by doing things multi-
ple times is accepted in favor of other goals resulting from
this replication.
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Fig. 1. Replication of application systems.
This architectural concept can be applied to all three
cloud layers. A case study at the SaaS-layer is discussed in
Section 4.1.
4.1 Case Studies: Replicating of Application Tasks
Imagine a cloud provider named InstantReporting that
provides the service of creating annual accounting reports
automatically out of a given set of business data. This is a
very typical scenario of cloud usage, because such a report
has to be published by all commercial entities once a year.
Hence, the resources required to create such reports are
only necessary for a small period of time every year. Thus,
by using a third-party cloud service for this, in-house
resources can be omitted, which would run idle most of the
year. On the other side, by sharing its service capabilities
among a large set of companies—all of which have to create
their reports at different times of the year—a cloud service
provider gains large benefits from providing such a shared
service “on the cloud.”
However, as promising as this scenario seems to be in
terms of using the cloud computing paradigm, it contains a
fundamental flaw: The cloud customers cannot verify that
the annual report created by the cloud service is correct.
There might have been accidental or intentional modifica-
tions of the source data for the report, or the processing
logic that creates the reports from the source data might
contain errors. In the worst case, the cloud system itself was
compromised (e.g., by a malicious competitor) and all
reports are slightly modified so that they look conclusive
but contain slightly reduced profit margins, intended to
make a competing company look bad—or even insolvent.
4.1.1 Dual Execution
In such a situation, a first and trivial approach for
verification might be that a cloud customer triggers the
creation of its annual accounting report more than once.
For instance, instead of giving the same request to one
cloud provider only (called Cloud A hereafter), a second
cloud provider (called Cloud B) that offers an equivalent
type of service is invoked in parallel. By placing the same
request at Clouds A and B, a cloud user can immediately
identify whether his request was processed differently in
Clouds A and B. Hence, this way, a secret exploitation of
either side’s service implementation would be detected.
However, besides the doubled costs of placing the same
request twice, this approach additionally relies on the
existence of at least two different cloud providers with
equivalent service offerings and comparable type of result.
Depending on the type of cloud resources used, this is
either easily the case—as even today there already exist
many different cloud providers offering equivalent services
(see Section 1)—or difficult in cases in which very specific
resources are demanded.
4.1.2 n Clouds Approach
A more advanced, but also more complex approach comes
from the distributed algorithms discipline: the Byzantine
Agreement Protocol. Assume the existence of n cloud
providers, of which f collaborate maliciously against the
cloud user, with n > 3f . In that case, each of the n clouds
performs the computational task given by the cloud user.
Then, all cloud providers collaboratively run a distributed
algorithm that solves the General Byzantine Agreement
problem (e.g., the TurpinCoan [16] or Exponential Information
Gathering [19, 6.2.3] algorithms). After that it is guaranteed
that all nonmalicious cloud providers know the correct
result of the computation. Hence, in the final step, the result
is communicated back to the cloud user via a Secure
Broadcast algorithm (e.g., plain flooding, with the cloud
user taking the majority as the result). Hence, the cloud user
can determine the correct result even in presence of
f malicious clouds.
4.1.3 Processor and Verifier
Instead of having Clouds A and B perform the very same
request, another viable approach consists in having one
cloud provider “monitor” the execution of the other cloud
provider. For instance, Cloud A may announce intermedi-
ate results of its computations to a monitoring process run
at Cloud B. This way, Cloud B can verify that Cloud A
makes progress and sticks to the computation intended by
the cloud customer. As an extension of this approach,
Cloud B may run a model checker service that verifies the
execution path taken by Cloud A on-the-fly, allowing for
immediate detection of irregularities.
One of the major benefits of this approach consists in its
flexibility. Cloud B does not have to know all details of the
execution run at Cloud A—especially not about the data
values processed—but is able to detect and report anoma-
lies to the cloud customer immediately. However, the
guarantees given by this approach strongly depend on the
type, number, and verifiability of the intermediate results
given to Cloud B.
5 PARTITION OF APPLICATION SYSTEM INTO TIERS
The architectural pattern described in the previous Section 4
enables the cloud user to get some evidence on the integrity
of the computations performed on a third-party’s resources
or services.
The architecture introduced in this section targets the
risk of undesired data leakage. It answers the question on
how a cloud user can be sure that the data access is
implemented and enforced effectively and that errors in the
application logic do not affect the user’s data?
To limit the risk of undesired data leakage due to
application logic flaws, the separation of the application
system’s tiers and their delegation to distinct clouds is
proposed (see Fig. 2). In case of an application failure, the
data are not immediately at risk since it is physically
separated and protected by an independent access control
scheme. Moreover, the cloud user has the choice to select
a particular—probably specially trusted—cloud provider
for data storage services and a different cloud provider
for applications.
It needs to be noted, that the security services provided
by this architecture can only be fully exploited if the
execution of the application logic on the data is performed
on the cloud user’s system. Only in this case, the application
provider does not learn anything on the users’ data. Thus,
the SaaS-based delivery of an application to the user side in
conjunction with the controlled access to the user’s data
performed from the same user’s system is the most far-
reaching instantiation.
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Besides the introduced overhead due to the additionally
involved cloud, this architecture requires, moreover, stan-
dardized interfaces to couple applications with data
services provided by distinct parties. Also generic data
services might serve for a wide range of applications there
will be the need for application specific services as well.
The partitioning of application systems into tiers and
distributing the tiers to distinct clouds provides some coarse-
grained protection against data leakage in the presence of
flaws in application design or implementation. This archi-
tectural concept can be applied to all three cloud layers. In
the next section, a case study at the SaaS-layer is discussed.
5.1 Case Study
Assume a SaaS-based service named PhotOrga, which
allows its users to upload and manage their photos as well
as share them with their family, friends, and other contacts.
For this purpose, PhotOrga provides an adequate access
control system. In such a setting, how can the user be sure
that this access control system has been implemented
correctly and effectively? Since the application logic and
the data storage of the PhotOrga system are tightly
integrated, a flaw in the application logic might have side
effects on the access control to the photos. This might result
in an unwanted data leakage (such as in the Google Docs
case mentioned in Section 2).
The separation of the application logic layer and the data
persistence layer with the assignment to two distinct clouds
reduces the data leakage risk in the presence of application
logic flaws. Since the data are not directly accessible by the
application, design or programming errors in the applica-
tion do not have such a widespread effect as in the
integrated scenario.
From an implementation point of view, this can be
realized using OAuth. When the application (on Cloud A)
wants to a access a photo it creates an OAuth request and
redirects the user to the storage provider (on Cloud B). The
user is than asked to grant or deny this authorization
request. This way the user gets more control over his data,
while having a slightly higher managing effort.
This scenario can be extended to a lot of other services
including e-mail, documents, spreadsheets, and so forth.
6 PARTITION OF APPLICATION LOGIC INTO
FRAGMENTS
This architecture variant targets the confidentiality of data
and processing logic. It gives an answer to the following
question: How can a cloud user avoid fully revealing the
data or processing logic to the cloud provider? The data
should not only be protected while in the persistent storage,
but in particular when it is processed.
The idea of this architecture is that the application logic
needs to be partitioned into fine-grained parts and these
parts are distributed to distinct clouds (see Fig. 3). This
approach can be instantiated in different ways depending
on how the partitioning is performed. The clouds
participating in the fragmented applications can be sym-
metric or asymmetric in terms of computing power and
trust. Two concepts are common. The first involves a
trusted private cloud that takes a small critical share of the
computation, and a untrusted public cloud that takes most
of the computational load. The second distributes the
computation among several untrusted public clouds, with
the assumption that these clouds will not collude to break
the security.
6.1 Obfuscating Splitting
By this approach, application parts are distributed to
different clouds in such a way, that every single cloud has
only a partial view on the application and gains only
limited knowledge. Therefore, this method can also hide
parts of the application logic from the clouds. For
application splitting, a first approach is using the existing
sequential or parallel logic separation. Thus, depending on
the application, every cloud provider just performs sub-
tasks on a subset of data.
An approach by Danezis and Livshits [20] is build
around a secure storage architecture and focusing on online
service provisioning, where the service depends on the
result of function evaluations on the user’s data. This
proposal uses the cloud as a secure storage, with keys
remaining on client side, e.g., in a private cloud. The
application is split in the following way: The service sends
the function to be evaluated to the client. The client retrieves
his necessary raw data and processes it according to the
service needs. The result and a proof of correctness is given
back to the service providing public cloud. In the cloud, the
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Fig. 3. Partition of application logic into fragments.
Fig. 2. Partition of application system into tiers.
remaining functionality of the service is offered based on
the aggregated input of the clients. This architecture
protects the detailed user data, and reveals only what the
cloud needs to know to provide the service.
Similarly, the FlexCloud approach [21] is based on inter-
connecting local, private computing environments to a
semitrusted public cloud for realizing complex workflows
or secure distributed storage. This approach utilizes multi-
ple resource-constrained secure computation environments
(“private clouds”) to form a collaborative computing
environment of similar trust level, a trustworthy “commu-
nity cloud.”
A difficult challenge of obfuscating splitting in general is
the fact that there is no generic pattern for the realization.
Careful analysis where the application can be split into
fragments must be performed regarding its confidentiality,
i.e., checking if the information that the participating cloud
providers receive is really innocuous.
6.2 Homomorphic Encryption and Secure
Multiparty Computation
Homomorphic encryption and secure multiparty computa-
tion both use cryptographic means to secure the data while
it is processed. In homomorphic encryption, the user
encrypts the data with his public key and uploads the
ciphertexts to the Cloud. The cloud can independently
compute on the encrypted data to obtain an encrypted
result, which only the user can decrypt. Therefore, in our
scenario, homomorphic encryption uses an asymmetric
fragmentation, where the user (or a small trusted private
cloud) manages the keys and performs the encryption and
decryption operations, while the massive computation on
encrypted data is done by an untrusted public cloud.
The possibility of fully homomorphic encryption sup-
porting secure addition and multiplication of ciphertexts
was first suggested in [22]. However, for a long time all
known homomorphic encryption schemes supported effi-
ciently only one operation [23], [24]. Therefore, the recent
discovery of fully homomorphic encryption by Gentry [25],
Asharov et al. [26] had a tremendous impact on the
cryptographic community and revived research in this field.
In the case of homomorphic encryption, the cloud has the
main share of work, as it operates on the encrypted inputs
to compute the encrypted output. However, the algorithms
are far from being practical, so the vision of clouds based on
homomorphic encryption seems unreal for the foreseeable
future. In addition, the applicability is limited, as for
services that go beyond the outsourcing of computation,
intermediate or final results need to be decrypted. This
requires either interaction with the entity that holds the key
(e.g., a private cloud) or the key is shared among several
clouds who then assist in decrypting values that are needed
in clear with a threshold encryption scheme [27].
The idea of secure multiparty computation was first
presented in [28] as a solution to the millionaires problem:
Two millionaires want to find out who is richer without
disclosing any further information about their wealth. Two
main variants of secure multiparty computation are known:
Based on linear secret sharing [29] or garbled circuits [30].
Schemes based on a linear secret sharing scheme work as
follows: The user computes and distributes the shares to the
different clouds. The clouds will jointly compute the
function of interest on these shares, communicating with
each other when necessary. In the end, the clouds hold
shares of the result which is sent back to the user who can
reconstruct the result. At least three clouds are necessary
for this scheme and no two of them should collude.
The approach of garbled circuits works as follows: One
cloud generates a circuit that is able to compute the
desired function and encrypts this circuit producing a
garbled circuit, which is however still executable. Then, this
cloud assists the users in encrypting their inputs accord-
ingly. Another cloud needs now to be present to evaluate
the circuit with the user’s inputs. Thus, this scheme requires
in general only two clouds. Although the ideas of multi-
party computation are old, it is ongoing research to reduce
the overhead by multiparty computation. Recent improve-
ments, e.g., on equality and comparison of values, has lead
to the constructions of programming frameworks, which
can already be considered practical [31], [32].
An example architecture that uses garbled circuits is the
TwinClouds approach [33] that utilizes a private cloud for
preparation of garbled circuits. The circuits itself is then
evaluated within a high-performance commodity cloud of
lower trust level-without lowering the security guarantees
for the processes outsourced to the public cloud.
In all cases, using secure multiparty computation in
distinct clouds guarantees the secrecy of the input data,
unless the cloud providers collude to open shares or
decrypt inputs. Assuming that the cloud provider itself is
not malicious, but might be compromised by attacks or
have single malicious employees, this collusion is hard to
establish so that a good protection is given. A multiparty
computation between clouds makes it possible to compute a
function on data in a way that no cloud provider learns
anything about the input or output data.
6.3 Case Studies
With secure multiparty computation, a number of partici-
pants can compute functions on their input values without
revealing any information on their individual inputs during
the computation. Here, we consider multiparty computa-
tion to be executed between several clouds. Using secure
multiparty computation can be used to better protect the
secrecy of the users’ data in online services available today,
but also has the potential to make new services possible that
do not exist today because of the user’s confidentiality
requirements and the lack of a trusted third party.
Problems in the latter category exist in today’s business
environment: Multiple corporations want to do a statistical
analysis of their business and market data. The result is
expected to help all of them; however, for obvious reasons,
no corporation wants to disclose their data to each other. If
the stakeholders cannot identify a single third party trusted
by all, this scenario requires multiparty computation
between the private clouds of the participating corporations
or outsourced to distinct public clouds.
An example for a real-world application of secure
multiparty computation is a sugar beet auction in Denmark
[34]. This auction is used by farmers selling their sugar
beets to the processing company Danisco. The farmers’
input to the auction depends on their economic situation
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and productivity, which they do not want to reveal to a
competitor or to Danisco. Clearly, Danisco also does not
want to give away the auction. As a trusted third party is
not easily found, the easiest solution was to set up a
multiparty computation between servers of the farmer’s
union, Danisco, and a supporting university.
Although still in a research prototype stage, another
application area of multiparty computation is the exchange
of monitoring data and security incidents for collaborative
network monitoring between several Internet providers
[35]. As network monitoring and attack detection have
quite strict real-time requirements to be useful, this
application requires highly efficient implementations of
multiparty computation. Some algorithms are implemented
in the SEPIA framework [32]. Recent work [36] is consider-
ing new secrecy/efficiency tradeoffs by introducing an
assisting server to support multiparty computation. The
assisting server does collect some shared information, so
that it might learn partial information during the computa-
tion process, but on the other hand can bring a big
efficiency gain in particular for equal comparisons.
Another application that has been discussed is supply
chain management. In supply chain management, several
companies who are part of a supply chain aim to establish
an optimal supply chain. If relevant information about the
supply chain, such as production cost and capacity, use of
resources and labor, is shared among all companies, it is
possible to find the optimal supply chain that brings the
product most cost efficient to the market and, thus, finally
optimizes profit for all involved companies. As the required
business data are usually considered to be confidential by
the companies, secure multiparty computation is a tool to
compute the optimal supply chain while keeping the input
data secret [37].
Secure multiparty computation can in principle be used
to distribute any computation task on multiple clouds. In
case just one party owns the data, it is for privacy reasons
not required to use more than two clouds, as we assume
that the two clouds do not collude. This limits the overhead
created by the multiparty computation. The task of creating
the annual accounting report already mentioned in Sec-
tion 4.1 can be an example if apart from data integrity the
property of data secrecy is required. Especially, for highly
visible stock corporations, the details of the accounting
must be kept confidential. Otherwise, insider trading or
other effects on the stock market are possible. However, due
to the nature of the accounting report creation (only needed
once a year, provider offers special software, and so on) it
still might be useful to perform this task inside the cloud. In
this case, using secret sharing and multiparty computation
with two cloud providers offers the required properties.
Other, noncryptographic ways of splitting such as
obfuscation splitting is possible for many applications. For
example, the calculation of earnings and expenses can be
distributed to two different cloud providers. These tasks
can be performed independently without any significant
overhead. In this case, the amount of loss or profit—which
is typically the most confidential value—remains undi-
sclosed to the cloud providers.
7 PARTITION OF APPLICATION DATA INTO
FRAGMENTS
This multicloud architecture specifies that the application
data is partitioned and distributed to distinct clouds (see
Fig. 4).
The most common forms of data storage are files and
databases. Files typically contain unstructured data (e.g.,
pictures, text documents) and do not allow for easily
splitting or exchanging parts of the data. This kind of data
can only be partitioned using cryptographic methods (see
Section 7.1).
Databases contain data in structured form organized in
columns and rows. Here, data partitioning can be per-
formed by distributing different parts of the database
(tables, rows, columns) to different cloud providers (see
Section 7.2). Finally, files can also contain structured data
(e.g., XML data). Here, the data can be splitted using similar
approaches like for databases. XML data, for example, can
be partitioned on XML element level. However, such
operations are very costly. Thus, this data are commonly
rather treated using cryptographic data splitting.
7.1 Cryptographic Data Splitting
Probably, the most basic cryptographic method to store data
securely is to store the data in encrypted form. While the
cryptographic key could remain at the user’s premises, to
increase flexibility in cloud data processing or to enable
multiuser systems it is beneficial to have the key available
online when needed [38]. This approach, therefore, dis-
tributes key material and encrypted data into different
clouds. For instance, with XML data, this can, e.g., be done
inside the XML document by using XML encryption [39].
A similar approach is taken by several solutions for
secure Cloud storage: The first approach to cryptographic
cloud storage [40] is a solution for encrypted key/value
storage in the cloud while maintaining the ability to easily
access the data. It involves searchable encryption [41], [42]
as the key component to achieve this. Searchable encryption
allows keyword search on encrypted data if an authorized
token for the keyword is provided. The keys are stored in a
trusted private cloud whereas the data resides in the
untrusted public cloud (see Section 6.2).
One example of a relational database with encrypted
data processing is CryptDB [43]. The database consists of a
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Fig. 4. Partition of application data into fragments.
database server that stores the encrypted data and a proxy
that holds the keys and provides a standard SQL interface
to the user. The data are encrypted in different layers with
schemes such as order-preserving encryption [44], homo-
morphic encryption [23], searchable encryption [41], and a
standard symmetric encryption system, such as the AES.
For every SQL query, the proxy identifies and provides only
the necessary keys to the server, so that exactly this query
can be answered. Obviously, this implies that the database
server may learn more keys with every new query. Hence,
security against persistent attackers is certainly limited
here. The advantage of cryptDB lies in the fact that the
database part is a standard MySQL database, and in that its
efficiency is only decreased marginally, as compared to
unencrypted data storage.
Another option is to compute a secret sharing of the data.
In a secret sharing protocol, no single cryptographic key is
involved. Instead, secret sharing splits the data into multi-
ple shares in such a way that the data can only be
reconstructed if more shares than a given threshold are
collected. This method integrates well with multiparty
computation, as presented in Section 6.2. As discussed,
multiparty computation often operates on such shares, so
that the clouds that form the peers of the multiparty
protocol can store their shares permanently without any
loss of security.
7.2 Database Splitting
For protecting information inside databases, one has to
distinguish two security goals: confidentiality of data items
(e.g., a credit card number) or confidentiality of data item
relationships (e.g., the items “Peter” and “AIDS” are not
confidential, but their relationship is). In the first case, data
splitting requires a scenario—similar to other approaches
presented before—with a least one trusted provider (or
additional encryption; see below). However, very often only
the relationship shall be protected, and this can be achieved
using just honest-but-curious providers.
A typical way of database splitting is pseudonymization:
One provider receives the data with some key fields (typical
personal identification data like name, address, and so on)
replaced by a random identifier, and the second provider
receives the mapping of the identifier to the original
information. This approach is used, for example, in a
commercial cloud security gateway [45].
For splitting a database table, there are two general
approaches: Vertical fragmentation and horizontal frag-
mentation [46]. With vertical fragmentation, the columns
are distributed to cloud providers in such a way that no
single provider learns a confidential relationship on his
own. A patient health record, for example, might be
fragmented into two parts, e.g., (name, patient num-
ber) and (patient number, disease). This way, the
individual providers only learn noncritical data relations.
However, for real-world applications, it is a nontrivial task
to find such a fragmentation. First, new relations can be
learned by performing transitive combination of existing
ones. Second, some relations can be concluded using
external knowledge. If, in the example above, the first
provider additionally learns about the relation (patient
number, medication), he has technically still no
knowledge about the patient’s disease. However, someone
with pharmaceutical background can derive the disease
from the medication.
Further, new relations can also be derived by combining
multiple data set. For instance, using again the relation of
(patient number, medication), the knowledge of a
combination of medications can ease the guessing of the
patient’s disease. Thus, also on a row level, database splitting
might be required. This is called horizontal fragmentation.
Finally, database splitting can also be combined with
encryption. Using key management mechanisms like men-
tioned before, some database columns are encrypted. The
combination of encryption and splitting protects confiden-
tial columns and still allows querying database entries
using plain text columns.
7.3 Case Study: Separation of Data Entities
As a case study for this multicloud architecture pattern, one
can consider the reverse of what needs to be done when
data sources are federated. In many cross-organization data
federation projects, a common task is to harmonize distinct
data sources schema wise to obtain common semantics and
structure. This enables to have a combined view on the
federated data. In many domains, this has been an active
research and development topic in recent years. Take the
federation of hospital data as an example, in which distinct
medical institutions federate their data on a certain disease,
as has, e.g., been the case in the EU-funded research project
@neurist concerning celebral aneurysms [47]. The main
challenge in this case is to find a method to federate the data
so that distributed data entities can be virtually correlated.
In the data partition pattern, however, there already
exists one common schema, because only one data source is
on the centre stage. The challenge here is instead to find a
partition of the data in a way that allows to distribute the
data entities to distinct clouds while minimizing the
amount of knowledge one cloud provider can gather by
analyzing the obtained data set. By this, it might be feasible
to outsource computationally intense queries to a multi-
cloud without violating the strict security and privacy
obligations attached to medical data (see also Section 8.3.1).
8 LEGAL COMPLIANCE WITH MULTICLOUD
ARCHITECTURES
Since legislation traditionally only slowly copes with
technological paradigm shifts, there are few to none cloud
specific regulations in place by now. Therefore, for cloud
computing the same legal framework is applicable as for
any other means of data processing. Generally, legal
compliance does not distinguish between different means
of technology but rather different types of information. For
instance, enterprises are facing other legal requirements for
the lawful processing of their tax information than for the
lawful processing of their Customer Relationship Manage-
ment. A one-cloud-fits-all approach does not reflect these
differing compliance requirements.
Multicloud architectures may be a viable solution for
enterprises to address these compliance issues. Hence, this
section gives a coarse-grained legal analysis on the different
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approaches, and their flaws and benefits in terms of
compliance and privacy impact.
The immanent conflict between cloud computing and the
world of laws and policies results from the borderless
nature of clouds in contrast to the mostly national scope of
legal frameworks. The most successful cloud service
providers operate their clouds across national borders in
multiple data centers all over the globe. Hence, they can
offer high availability even in case of regional failure as well
as reduced costs because of their choice of location. In
contrast, the cloud customer is subject to its national legal
requirements, and faces the problem to ensure legal
compliance to national laws in a multinational environ-
ment. This conflict is neither new nor unique to cloud
computing, but the highly dynamic and virtualized nature
of clouds intensifies it as the applicability of laws relate to
physical location.
The legal uncertainties of cloud computing, especially in
Europe with its strict data protection laws, are subject to an
ongoing discussion. Nevertheless, legal experts agree that
lawful cloud computing is possible as long as the adequate
technical, organizational, and contractual safeguards for the
specific type of information to be processed are in place.
Before deciding on which cloud service type to use, be it
public, private, or hybrid, IaaS, PaaS, or SaaS, the enterprise
needs to conduct a risk assessment. This risk assessment is
not only the best practice but also sometimes legally
mandatory, e.g., in form of a Privacy Risk Assessment in
the proposed European Data Protection Regulation [48]. A
proper risk assessment before “going cloud” means to
identify one’s internal processes and the relevant informa-
tion involved in these processes, a risk and threat analysis,
as well as identifying legal compliance requirements that
have to be met and the necessary safeguards to be installed.
The outcome of such a risk assessment may be that not all of
enterprise’s processes are suitable for a public cloud or not
yet cloud ready.
Usually, enterprises process varying types of informa-
tion, which have different grades of sensitivity and need
according security controls. There may be business-critical
information, which requires maximum availability, but is
less critical in terms of confidentiality. Similarly, there may
be information for which a guaranteed availability rate of
99 percent is sufficient, but a breach of confidentiality
would be crucial. Legal and other compliance frameworks
may ask for specific additional safeguards. For instance, for
processing of medical information of US citizens, a Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA of
1996, [49]) certification may be required. Similarly, for credit
card information processing, compliance to the Payment
Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS, [50]) is
mandatory. Further, US Federal Information Security
Management Act (FISMA of 2002, [51]) and US Federal
Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP,
[52]) are relevant for processing information of US Federal
Agencies. Cloud customers based in the European Union
that are contracting with cloud service providers outside
the European Economic Area to outsource the processing of
personal identifiable information have to adhere to the
EU Data Protection Directive [53]. This includes mandatory
contractual safeguards for the export of personal data,
including mandatory contractual safeguards such as Stan-
dard Contractual Clauses and Binding Corporate Rules (see
[54], [55]). Furthermore, many national legislations require
specific information to stay within the national borders of
the country. This typically applies to information regarding
national security, but also to information of public autho-
rities or electronic health records.
Potential cloud customers are facing several of these
requirements for security controls, standards, and certifica-
tions, probably even varying per process. Identifying one
cloud service provider to offer all of these options like a
modular system seems impossible.
Multicloud approaches may help addressing these
issues. As discussed next, the compliance benefits and
drawbacks of the identified multicloud architectures, in
general, seem auspicious.
8.1 Replication of Application
This approach appears to have the fewest benefits regard-
ing legal compliance as it multiplies the necessity to identify
and choose a cloud service provider perfectly tailored for
the requirements of the relevant process and information.
Since this could mean negotiating and concluding indivi-
dual contracts with several cloud service providers,
replicating a highly sensitive process or an application
seems to unreasonably tie up personnel and financial
resources. Therefore, this approach has its value for
information and processes with low sensitivity but high
availability and soundness requirements.
8.2 Partition of Application System into Tiers
The separation of logic and data offers the possibility to
store the data in the cloud with compliant controls and
safeguards and to outsource the processing logic to a not
specifically certified cloud with favorable price. It also
allows for storing the data in a national cloud while the
application logic is outsourced to a multinational one.
A drawback of this approach is that the compliant
separation of logic and data is only possible if the
application provider does not receive the customer’s data
in any case. The processing needs to take place in an
environment as secure and certified as the chosen storage
cloud. This can either be the customer’s own premise, an
approach that almost annihilates the benefits of outsourcing,
cost reduction, and seamless scalability of using cloud
computing, because the customer needs to provision
sufficient and compliant resources by himself. Alternatively,
the application logic can also take place in a different tier of
the compliant storage cloud, or on a different cloud with
similar compliance level. The drawback of this approach
obviously is that the customer has to fully trust those cloud
service providers that receive all information, logic, and
data. This somewhat contradicts the initial motivation of
this multicloud approach.
8.3 Partition of Application Logic/Data
8.3.1 Obfuscating Splitting and Database Splitting
These approaches are especially valuable for dealing with
personal identifiable data. Segmenting personal identifi-
able data—if realized in a reasonable way—is a viable
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privacy safeguard. Best practice would be to separate the
data in a way that renders the remaining data pseudon-
ymous. Pseudonymity itself is a privacy safeguard (see [56,
Section 3a]). Therefore, outsourcing pseudonymized in-
formation, which is unlinkable to a specific person, does
require considerable less additional safeguards as com-
pared to nonpseudonymized information.
Pseudonymization based on the Obfuscated Splitting
approach could be used, e.g., in Human Resources or
Customer Relationship Management. A potential cloud
customer would have to remove all directly identifying data
in the first place, like name, social security number, credit
card information, or address, and store this information
separately, either on premise or in a cloud with adequately
high-security controls. The remaining data can still be
linked to the directly identifying data by means of an
unobvious identifier (the pseudonym), which is unusable for
any malicious third parties. The unlinkability of the
combined pseudonymized data to a person can be ensured
by performing a carefully conducted privacy risk assess-
ment. These assessments are always constrained by the
assumptions of an adversary’s “reasonable means” [53,
Recital 26]. The cloud customer has the option to outsource
the pseudonymized data to a cloud service provider with
fewer security controls, which may result in additional cost
savings. If the customer decides to outsource the directly
identifiable data to a different cloud service provider, she
has to ensure that these two providers do not cooperate,
e.g., by using the same IaaS provider in the backend.
8.3.2 Cryptographic Data Splitting and Homomorphic
Encryption
As of today, this approach appears to be the most viable
alternative, both from the technical and economical point of
view. State-of-the-art encryption of data with adequate key
management is one of the most effective means to safeguard
privacy and confidentiality when outsourcing data to a
cloud service provider. Nevertheless, at least in the
European Union, encryption is not considered to relieve
cloud customers from all of their responsibilities and legal
obligations. Encrypted data keep the nature it has in its
decrypted state; personally identifiable information in
encrypted form is still regarded as personally identifiable
information (see [57]). Encryption is considered as an
important technical security measure; however, some
additional mandatory legal safeguards still apply. For
personally identifiable data, this means that, e.g., adequate
contracts for the export of data to countries outside of the
European Economic Area have to be in place.
9 ASSESSMENT OF MULTICLOUD ARCHITECTURES
Given the vast amount of specific approaches for realizing
each of the presented multicloud architectures, it is not
feasible to perform a general assessment adequately covering
all of them. Furthermore, many approaches are only suitable
in very special circumstances, rendering each comparison
to other approaches of the same domain inadequate.
However, in this section we perform a high-level
assessment of all multicloud approaches presented above,
focussing on their capabilities in terms of security, feasibility,
and compliance, as shown in Fig. 5. Therein, the security
considerations indicate an approach’s general improve-
ments and aggravations in terms of integrity, confidentiality,
and availability of application logic or data, respectively. For
instance, the n clouds approach is highly beneficial in terms of
integrity (every deviation in execution that occurs at a
single cloud provider only can immediately be detected and
corrected), but quite disadvantageous in terms of con-
fidentiality (because every cloud provider learns everything
about the application logic and data).
The feasibility aspect covers issues of applicability, business
readyness, and ease of use. Herein, applicability means the
degree of flexibility of using one approach to solve different
types of problems. Business-readyness evaluates how far the
research on a multicloud approach has progressed and if it
is ready for real-world applications, whereas ease of use
indicates the complexity of implementing the particular
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Fig. 5. Assessment and comparison of multicloud approaches.
approach. As an example, the approaches of secure multi-
party computation may be of high benefits in terms of
security, but only solve a very specific type of computation
problem (i.e., are limited in applicability), and are quite
complex to implement (i.e., not easy to use) even if they can
be applied reasonably.
The compliance dimension provides a high-level indica-
tion of the impact of each approach to the legal obligations
implied to the cloud customer when utilizing that approach.
Application of the dual execution approach, for instance, may
be favorable in terms of security and feasibility, but requires
complex contractual negotiations between the cloud custo-
mer and two different cloud providers, doubling the
workload and legal obligations for the whole cloud
application. Equivalently, the use of more than two different
cloud providers (n clouds approach) improves on integrity
and availability, but also requires n contract negotiations
and risk assessments, amplified by the necessity to assess
the risks associated with automated detection and correction
of irregularities within the n parallel executions.
Based on the observations subsumed in Fig. 5, we can
conclude that there is no such thing as a “best” approach.
From a technical point of view, the use of multiple cloud
providers leads to a perceived advantage in terms of
security, based on the perception of shared—and thus
mitigated—risks. From a compliance point of view, how-
ever, many of these advantages do not sustain, and may
even lead to additional legal obligations—and hence to
higher risks. The few approaches that would be beneficial in
terms of both security and compliance tend to be quite
limited in feasibility of application, and are not business-
ready yet or rather nontrivial to use in real-world settings.
10 CONCLUSION
The use of multiple cloud providers for gaining security
and privacy benefits is nontrivial. As the approaches
investigated in this paper clearly show, there is no single
optimal approach to foster both security and legal com-
pliance in an omniapplicable manner. Moreover, the
approaches that are favorable from a technical perspective
appear less appealing from a regulatory point of view, and
vice versa. The few approaches that score sufficiently in
both these dimensions lack versatility and ease of use, hence
can be used in very rare circumstances only.
As can be seen from the discussions of the four major
multicloud approaches, each of them has its pitfalls and
weak spots, either in terms of security guarantees, in terms
of compliance to legal obligations, or in terms of feasibility.
Given that every type of multicloud approach falls into one
of these four categories, this implies a state of the art that is
somewhat dissatisfying.
However, two major indications for improvement can be
taken from the examinations performed in this paper. First
of all, given that for each type of security problem there
exists at least one technical solution approach, a highly
interesting field for future research lies in combining the
approaches presented here. For instance, using the n clouds
approach (and its integrity guarantees) in combination with
sound data encryption (and its confidentiality guarantees)
may result in approaches that suffice for both technical
and regulatory requirements. We explicitly do not investi-
gate this field here—due to space restrictions; however,
we encourage the research community to explore these
combinations, and assess their capabilities in terms of the
given evaluation dimensions.
Second, we identified the fields of homomorphic en-
cryption and secure multiparty computation protocols to be
highly promising in terms of both technical security and
regulatory compliance. As of now, the limitations of these
approaches only stem from their narrow applicability and
high complexity in use. However, given their excellent
properties in terms of security and compliance in multi-
cloud architectures, we envision these fields to become the
major building blocks for future generations of the multi-
cloud computing paradigm.
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